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The CAA
Motor Vehicle
Inspection and
Maintenance
Program: Is It
Cost Effective?
by Arnold W. Reitze Jr.

Arnold W. Reitze Jr. is a Professor of Law at the S.J.
Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah
and a member of the Utah Air Quality Board.

Summary
Under the Clean Air Act, state-run vehicle inspection and maintenance (I/M) programs aim at preventing both manufacturers and consumers from
circumventing or tampering with emissions control
technology. Recent manufacturer cheating scandals,
however, were detected by means other than I/M programs, and much I/M enforcement has been targeted
at relatively low-level offenses. This Article traces the
evolution of the I/M program and examines whether
it currently provides benefits greater than its costs to
vehicle owners, using Utah’s Wasatch Front (which
includes Salt Lake City) to illustrate how the program
operates in practice. It concludes that there is little
current information to support or reject the efficacy
of the I/M program, and that a fresh look is warranted to improve its effectiveness.
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F

or nearly half a century, the Clean Air Act (CAA) has
included a program to require new motor vehicles to
meet federal emission standards.1 The federal government preempts the regulation of new motor vehicle emissions, but states regulate vehicle emissions after title passes
to the consumer. This often includes an inspection and
maintenance (I/M) program. The I/M program expanded
significantly after 1977 because of the need for more stringent controls on emission sources in areas that were not
achieving air quality goals.
I/M is used to assure that vehicles continue to meet
applicable emission standards after title passes to a consumer. In addition, I/M was needed because both the
automotive industry and vehicle owners were motivated to
circumvent the emissions control technology used to meet
federal motor vehicle emissions standards. Both manufacturers and consumers were tampering with or removing air
pollution control devices.
Over the years, the CAA and its implementing regulations evolved to further reduce motor vehicle emissions,
which has included strengthening the I/M program. This
has resulted in the development of vehicles with more
effective and more complex emission control technology.
The I/M program also evolved to produce a more sophisticated inspection process. However, the I/M program has
failed to be an effective tool for preventing manufacturers
from cheating on the CAA’s motor vehicle emission control requirements.2
This Article traces the evolution of the I/M program
and examines whether the current I/M program provides
benefits greater than its costs in terms of both money and
time to vehicle owners. Because the I/M program is implemented by state and local governments, Utah’s Wasatch
Front is used to illustrate how the program operates. Salt
Lake City, located in Wasatch Front, is ranked by the
American Lung Association as the seventh most-polluted
U.S. city for short-term particulate pollution.3

Author’s Note: Research assistance was provided by J.D. candidate
Angeline Portel. This research was supported by the Albert and
Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty Excellence. The author wishes
to thank Joe Thomas, Program Manager, and Richard McKeague
III, Air Quality Modeler, Utah Division of Air Quality, as well as
Timothy Russ and Kyle Olson of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s Region 8 for their assistance. All opinions are solely the view
of the author.
1.	
2.	
3.	

42 U.S.C. §7521; ELR Stat. CAA §202.
See Arnold W. Reitze Jr., The Volkswagen Air Pollution Emissions Litigation,
46 ELR 10564 (2016).
Press Release, American Lung Association, “State of the Air” Report Finds
Continued Improvement in Air Quality, Yet Increase in Life-Threatening
Spikes of Particle Pollution (Apr. 19. 2017).
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History of the I/M Program

The Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act of 1965
authorized federal regulation of automotive emissions.4
In 1966, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare established federal emission standards that first
applied to model year (MY) 1968 vehicles. Subsequently,
the Air Quality Act of 19675 provided for federal preemption of new motor vehicle emissions controls, although
California was eligible for a waiver so that it could set morestringent standards.6 It also established a program that provided grants for states to use to develop vehicle inspection
programs.7 An important feature of the 1967 Act was its
provision that it did not “preclude or deny to any State or
political subdivision thereof the right otherwise to control,
regulate, or restrict the use, operation, or movement of registered or licensed motor vehicles.”8
The CAA Amendments of 1970 gave the Administrator of the recently created U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) expanded authority to prescribe emission
standards for new motor vehicles, but continued the 1967
authority for states to regulate motor vehicle emissions
after the initial registration.9 Although the states could
have developed I/M programs, few did.10 It was not until
the enactment of the 1977 CAA Amendments that I/M
became a required program for many states.11 The CAA
Amendments of 1977 established December 31, 1982, as
the deadline for states to meet national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS).12 The deadline could be extended
until December 31, 1987, for violators of the carbon monoxide (CO) or ozone (O3) NAAQS if specified emission
control measures were adopted.13 This included a mandate
to establish an I/M program in nonattainment areas.14
EPA issued an I/M policy guidance document in 1978,
but it never issued binding regulations.15 This resulted in
considerable variation in state programs. The I/M program
was resisted by most states, and EPA was slow to sanction states that failed to meet the I/M requirements.16 To
4.	
5.	
6.	

7.	
8.	
9.	
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992.
Pub. L. No. 90-148, §§103-104, 81 Stat. 485, 486-88.
Id. §208 (CAA §209, 42 U.S.C. §7543(a)); see also City of Chicago
v. General Motors Corp., 467 F.2d 1262, 1264, 2 ELR 20636 (7th Cir.
1972) (holding that the Air Quality Act of 1967 “explicitly provided for
preemption”); see generally David P. Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State
Authority and Federal Preemption, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1083, 1090 (1970).
Pub. L. No. 90-148, §§104, 210, and 209.
Id. §208(c).
Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§202 & 209(c).
Prior to 1974, I/M programs were in operation in New York (for taxi
cabs); Chicago, Illinois; Riverside, California; Cincinnati, Norwood, and
Hamilton County, Ohio; Portland, Oregon; and Phoenix and Tucson,
Arizona. National Academy of Sciences, Report by the Committee
on Motor Vehicle Emissions 132-33 (1974).
CAA §§110(a)(2)(G), 172(a)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. §§7410(a)(2)(G), 7502(a)
(2)(C).
Pub. L. No. 95-95, §129, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §7502).
CAA §§110(a)(2)(G), 172, 42 U.S.C. §§7410(a)(2)(G), 7502.
CAA §172(b)(11)(B), 42 U.S.C. §7502(b)(11)(B).
Inspection/Maintenance Program Requirement, 57 Fed. Reg. 52950,
52952 (Nov. 5, 1992).
See Arnold W. Reitze Jr. & Barry Needleman, Control of Air Pollution From
Mobile Sources Through Inspection and Maintenance Programs, 30 Harv. J.
on Legis. 409 (1993).
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obtain the cooperation of the states, EPA approved emission reduction credits for I/M programs that helped states
obtain the emissions reductions for CO and O3 that are
needed to obtain EPA’s approval of a state implementation
plan (SIP).17 EPA also provided grants to appropriate state
agencies in amounts up to two-thirds of the cost of developing an I/M program.18
The 1977 I/M programs were only partially effective,
for several reasons. First, vehicle emissions were tested
when the engine was idling and at high idle (2,500 revolutions per minute), but not at the engine speed of a vehicle
operating at highway speed. The idle mode test is easy
to perform and requires minimal technical training. To
pass this test, hydrocarbon (HC) and CO emissions must
meet EPA’s standards for the vehicle’s MY.19 Second, vehicles were visually inspected for tampering, but the most
common tampering involved using less-expensive leaded
gasoline.20 The use of leaded gasoline destroys the effectiveness of the catalytic converter, which results in increased
emissions, but the I/M test may not detect this tampering.21 Eventually, the CAA prohibited lead additives in
gasoline.22 Finally, another weakness of the I/M program
is that failed vehicles may not be repaired if the repair cost
exceeds the regulatory cap that limits the cost imposed by
the I/M program.23
The 1990 CAA Amendments imposed many new
requirements on states with nonattainment areas. 24
Ozone nonattainment areas were classified into five
categories (marginal, moderate, serious, severe, or
extreme) based on the severity of the nonattainment
problem. 25 New requirements were placed on marginal
areas, with additional requirements for areas with lower
air quality classifications. 26
Ozone nonattainment areas are required to at least
have a basic I/M program.27 Urbanized “serious” or worse
nonattainment areas with a 1980 population of 200,000
or more must have an enhanced I/M program.28 States
within the O3 transport region, which includes 11 northeastern states and the District of Columbia, must have
enhanced I/M programs for their metropolitan statistical areas or areas with a 1990 population of 100,000 or
more regardless of the area’s classification.29 CO nonattainment areas are divided into moderate and serious
categories.30 Moderate areas are required to have a basic
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 418.
CAA §110, 42 U.S.C. §7410.
CAA §202(g), 42 U.S.C. §7521(g).
See generally Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Controlling Automotive Air Pollution
Through Inspection and Maintenance Programs, 47 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 705
(1979).
See generally Arnold W. Reitze Jr., The Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives
Under Section 211 of the Clean Air Act, 29 Tulsa L.J. 485 (1994).
CAA §211(g) & (k), 42 U.S.C. §7544(g) & (k).
40 C.F.R. §51.380(a)(6) & (7) (2017).
Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399.
CAA §181, 42 U.S.C. §7511.
CAA §182, 42 U.S.C. §7511a.
CAA §182(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. §7511a(a)(2)(B).
CAA §182(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. §7511a(c)(3).
CAA §184, 42 U.S.C. §7511c.
CAA §186(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §7512(a)(1).
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I/M program, but nonattainment areas with an air quality design value greater than 12.7 parts per million at the
time of classification are required to have an enhanced
I/M program.31 In August 1990, 96 urban areas were in
violation of NAAQS for O3 and 41 areas could not attain
the CO standard.32
In response to the 1990 CAA Amendments, EPA
upgraded the basic I/M requirements to provide new minimum standards concerning inspection frequency and test
methods, as well as other improvements to the quality of
the measurements.33 The upgraded I/M program is similar
to the 1977 program, but is based on updated information,
and the emission reduction benefits are estimated using
the current version of EPA’s mobile source emission model.34 An idle test is used to determine whether a vehicle’s
exhaust emissions meet standards specified in 40 C.F.R.
Part 85, Subpart W.35 Nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions
must not increase because of steps taken to meet HC and
CO requirements unless it is shown that NOx reductions
will not improve air quality in the O3 nonattainment area.36
For MY 2001 and later, the basic program requires lightduty vehicles (LDVs) with an on-board diagnostic (OBD)
system to be inspected, and any malfunctions identified
by the system must be repaired.37 EPA estimates that 60%
of the total tailpipe HC emissions from LDVs are caused
by 20% of the vehicles that have serious emission control
system malfunctions or degradation.38
The states with serious or worse O3 nonattainment
areas were required to submit an enhanced I/M program
by November 15, 1992.39 The statute specifies the seven
elements required for an enhanced I/M program: (1) the
use of computerized emission analyzers, including onroad testing devices; (2) no waivers for vehicles or parts
covered by performance warranties, with limited exceptions; (3) the maximum repair costs a vehicle owner is
required to expend must be increased to $450 for repairs,
adjusted annually based on the consumer price index;
(4) enforcement through denial of vehicle registration,
unless the state can demonstrate a more-effective enforcement program; (5) annual inspections, unless the state
shows biennial inspections are as effective; (6) a centralized program, unless the state can demonstrate a decentralized program is as effective; and (7) a program for
inspection of emission control diagnostic systems and the
repair of identified malfunctions.40
31. CAA §187(a)(4) & (6), 42 U.S.C. §7512(a)(4) & (6). The design value is
the second highest eight-hour CO value evaluated over a two-year period.
32. Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines; Regulations Requiring On-Board Diagnostic Systems on 1994 and
Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicles and Light-Duty Trucks, 56 Fed. Reg.
48272, 48273 (proposed Sept. 24, 1991).
33. 40 C.F.R. §§51.352-.358 (2017).
34. Id. §51.352(a) (2016).
35. Id.
36. Id. §51.352(b) (2016).
37. Id. §51.352(c) (2016).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. CAA §182(c)(3)(C), 42 U.S.C. §7511a(c)(3)(C).
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EPA promulgated more-specific requirements for the
enhanced I/M program in its regulations,41 including NOx
and volatile organic compound (VOC) performance standards in O3 nonattainment areas.42 The standards are based
on the MY of the vehicle.43 Enhanced I/M requires testing under load during cycles of acceleration and deceleration, which is called the transient loaded, high-tech, or I/
M240 exhaust test.44 Because it simulates actual driving
conditions, the loaded mode test provides a better indication of actual emissions than does the idle mode test. The
regulations also require monitoring the effectiveness of the
vapor recovery and recirculation mechanisms installed on
vehicles built after 1971 using an evaporative system integrity test (pressure test) and an evaporative performance test
(purge test).45 Enhanced I/M also requires the OBD system to be inspected and malfunctions repaired.46 States are
required to deny motor vehicle registration if a vehicle fails
the enhanced I/M test.47 However, an alternative enforcement mechanism may be used by a state if it is more effective than registration denial.48
Following enactment of the 1990 CAA Amendments,
there was considerable resistance to implementing the
I/M program by some states.49 A significant controversy
involved EPA’s insistence on the adoption of centralized
I/M programs that were required by the statute unless the
state demonstrated a decentralized program was equally
effective.50 A centralized enhanced I/M program was
unpopular with most states because it forced vehicle owners to search for a limited number of centralized testing
facilities. In addition, if testing and repairs could not be
completed at the same facility, vehicle owners could be subject to a “ping-pong effect” by being forced to travel from a
testing facility to a separate repair station and then return
to the testing facility to ensure that the repairs corrected
the emissions control problems.51 Moreover, a centralized
system forced existing test stations to discontinue testing,
which resulted in their loss of testing revenue as well as the
income generated by related repair work.52
In November 1994, the mid-term national elections
created a Republican majority in Congress,53 which led
to EPA proposing a rule to allow the states to have more
41. Inspection and Maintenance Program Requirements, 57 Fed. Reg. 31050
(1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §51.351).
42. 40 C.F.R. §51.351(f ) (2016).
43. Id. §51.351(f )(7).
44. Id. §51.351(f )(6).
45. Id. §51.357(b)(3).
46. Id. §51.351(c) (2016).
47. Id. §51.361.
48. Id.
49. See generally Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Federalism and the Inspection and
Maintenance Program Under the Clean Air Act, 27 Pac. L.J. 1461, 1500
(1996) [hereinafter Federalism and the Inspection and Maintenance Program].
50. CAA §182(c)(3)(C)(vi); 42 U.S.C. §7511a(c)(3)(C)(vi).
51. Federalism and the Inspection and Maintenance Program, supra note 49, at
1502.
52. Id.
53. See Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation
Plans—Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 Vill. Envtl. L.J.
209, 272 (2004); Federalism and the Inspection and Maintenance Program,
supra note 49, at 1511.
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flexibility in addressing the I/M program requirements.54
A rule change was finalized on September 18, 1995,55
which addressed many of the concerns of the states
administering the enhanced I/M program.56 Among the
provisions of the flexibility rule was a change in the frequency of testing, allowing it to be done every other year.
In addition, there was a provision allowing the required
testing to be performed at a decentralized test-and-repair
facility even though EPA continued to believe centralized inspections were more effective.57 A 50% reduction
in emissions credits was imposed on states using the
combined test-and-repair facilities, despite heavy opposition to this penalty.58 The 1995 flexibility rule also created a low enhanced I/M performance standard, which
was easier to perform and less costly than the enhanced
I/M performance standard that was required in more
seriously polluted areas.59
The conflict between EPA and the states was addressed
on November 28, 1995, when President Bill Clinton signed
into law the National Highway System Designation Act.60
Its §348 made two significant changes to the I/M program. First, EPA:

10-2017

develop SIP revisions for nonattainment areas that would
satisfy EPA and avoid the onerous penalties for noncompliance with SIP requirements.66

II.

Testing Based on the Use of
OBD Systems

Since 1981, manufacturers of automobiles have used onboard computer systems to control engine operations.
The early versions of the OBD system would detect a
malfunction in the vehicle, and the malfunction indicator light (MIL, or the check engine warning light)
would illuminate. 67
The 1990 CAA Amendments required an OBD system
to be standard on all LDVs with a gross vehicle weight up
to 8,500 pounds.68 Beginning with MY 1996 vehicles,
improved technology, known as OBD Generation II, or
OBD II, was used.69 It became subject to federally mandated I/M diagnostic checks beginning in 2002.70 The
statute directed EPA to promulgate regulations requiring
manufacturers to install on all new LDVs and light-duty
trucks (LDTs) diagnostic systems capable of the following:

shall not require adoption or implementation by a State
of a test-only I/M240 enhanced vehicle inspection and
maintenance program as a means of compliance with section 182 or 187 of the Clean Air Act . . . , but the Administrator may approve such a program if a State chooses to
adopt the program.61

(1) Accurately identifying emission-related system
deterioration or malfunction, including, at a minimum, the catalytic converter and oxygen sensor,
which could cause or result in failure of the vehicle
to comply with emission standards for the vehicle’s
useful life,

Second, the “Administrator shall not disapprove or apply
an automatic discount to a state implementation plan revision . . . because . . . such plan revision is a decentralized
or a test-and-repair program.”62 Finally, EPA is to grant full
interim approval to plans that show “a good-faith effort” to
meet CAA requirements.63
On January 9, 1998, EPA removed the requirement that
states use I/M240 technology, which allowed less-expensive testing technology to be used.64 EPA eventually succumbed to state pressure and allowed decentralized I/M
programs to continue, and local testing by private facilities
became the norm throughout most of the country.65 States
gradually accepted the I/M mandate because of the need to

(2) Alerting the vehicle’s owner or operator to the likely
need for emission-related components or systems
maintenance or repair,

54. U.S. EPA, Inspection/Maintenance Flexibility Amendments, 60 Fed. Reg.
20934 (proposed Apr. 28, 1995).
55. U.S. EPA, Inspection/Maintenance Flexibility Amendments, 60 Fed. Reg.
48029 (Sept. 18, 1995).
56. 40 C.F.R. §51.355(a) (2017).
57. 40 C.F.R. §51.353 (2017).
58. See State Officials Not Pleased EPA’s Flexible Enhanced I/M Rule Still Does
Not Address 50% Discount, 6 Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA) 19:19 (Sept. 21,
1995).
59. 40 C.F.R. §51.351(g) (2016).
60. Pub. L. No. 104-59, 109 Stat. 568.
61. Id. at 616.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Minor Amendments to Inspection Maintenance Program Evaluation
Requirements; Amendments to the Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 1362 (Jan. 9,
1998) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §51.353(c)).
65. Federalism and the Inspection and Maintenance Program, supra note 49, at
1514.

(3) Storing and retrieving fault codes specified by the
administrator, and
(4) Providing access to stored information in a manner
specified by the administrator.71
In addition, §202(m) requires manufacturers to make
available to interested persons all necessary emissionrelated maintenance and repair information, including
information needed to make use of the OBD II system.72
Such information is to be provided according to regulations adopted by EPA. After regulations were promulgated,
the states had two years to modify their I/M programs to
provide for inspection of OBD systems and for maintenance or repair of malfunctions.73
66. The most important sanction is EPA’s power to block transportation
money from going to a noncompliant state. CAA §179(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§7509(b)(1).
67. David Sosnowski & Edward Gardetto, U.S. EPA, Performing
Onboard Diagnostic Checks as Part of a Vehicle Inspection and
Maintenance Program 3, 5 (2001) (EPA 420-R-01-015).
68. CAA §202(m), 42 U.S.C. §7521(m).
69. OBD II, OBD-II Background, http://www.obdii.com/background.html
(last visited Aug. 3, 2017).
70. 40 C.F.R. §51.357(a)(12) (2002).
71. CAA §202(m)(1), 42 U.S.C. §7521(m)(1).
72. CAA §202(m)(5), 42 U.S.C. §7521(m)(5).
73. CAA §201(m)(3), 42 U.S.C. §7521(m)(3).
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Under the 1990 CAA Amendments, states required to
implement I/M programs were further required to incorporate an evaluation of the OBD computer as part of those
programs. On November 5, 1992, EPA promulgated a final
rule related to state air quality implementation plans for
I/M programs.74 At the time the 1992 rule was published,
certification regulations for OBD II had not been finalized,
so EPA reserved space in the I/M rule to address OBD-I/M
requirements at a later date.75 EPA reported that 31 of the
33 state and local areas that require I/M tests incorporated
the use of OBD technology into their I/M procedures.76
On February 19, 1993, EPA promulgated an updated
final OBD II regulation.77 For LDVs and LDTs with gasoline engines, the rule requires that the OBD II system
monitor the performance and detect malfunctions and
deterioration of the catalyst and oxygen sensor and detect
engine misfire.78 The OBD II system is required to detect
the occurrence of a malfunction or deterioration of any
other emission-related powertrain system or component
that results in an exhaust emission increase greater than
specified in the regulation.79 It must also detect the occurrence of any leakage or other malfunction of the vapor
recovery or purge systems that result in evaporative emissions exceeding specified limits.80 The information identifying the likely problem must be stored in the vehicle’s
computer, and the MIL must be illuminated.81 There are
separate requirements for vehicles with diesel engines.82
The rule also requires that the OBD II system monitor and detect electrical failure or disconnection of any
emission-related component that, either directly or
indirectly, sends information to, or receives information from, the vehicle’s on-board computer. 83 If an electrical disconnection occurs that prevents or limits the
operation of the component, regardless of the emission
effect, the MIL must be illuminated and a trouble code
stored. 84 The rule also contains anti-tampering provisions to protect the on-board computer from tampering,
and to make inspection of the OBD II system an effective enforcement measure during I/M testing. 85 Because
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
(D.C.) Circuit vacated part of the regulations dealing
with tampering involving the OBD II systems certified
74. U.S. EPA, Inspection/Maintenance Program Requirements, 57 Fed. Reg.
52950 (Nov. 5, 1992).
75. Id.
76. U.S. EPA, On-Board Diagnostics (OBD): Status of State and Local (OBD)
Inspection/Maintenance (I/M) Programs, https://www.epa.gov/state-andlocal-transportation/board-diagnostics-obd-status-state-and-local-obd (last
updated Aug. 2, 2016).
77. Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines; Regulations Requiring On-Board Diagnostic Systems on 1994 and
Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicles and Light-Duty Trucks, 58 Fed. Reg.
9468 (Feb. 19, 1993).
78. Id. at 9471.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 9472.
85. Id.
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to California’s OBD II regulations, EPA modified its
regulations on October 7, 1994. 86
On August 18, 1995, EPA proposed modifications to
the requirements applicable to I/M inspections of the
OBD II systems. 87 On August 30, 1996, EPA promulgated a final rule revising the requirements associated
with OBD II systems. 88 This rulemaking promulgated
appropriate revisions to federal OBD II regulations so
that compliance with California’s revised OBD II requirements satisfies federal requirements. 89 On September 20,
2000, EPA proposed to allow states to use an analysis of
the computerized OBD II systems in lieu of tailpipe tests
and evaporative system purge and fill-neck pressure tests
on MY 1996 or newer vehicles.90 The rule was finalized
on April 5, 2001.91
EPA’s regulations concerning OBD are found at 40
C.F.R. §86.1806-05. They are largely based on California’s regulations.92 For MY 2017 and later vehicles, OBD
requirements are found at 40 C.F.R. §86.1806-17. These
regulations require the OBD II system to detect malfunctions or deterioration of emission-related components or
elements of design before such malfunctions or deterioration individually cause emission increases above thresholds set by EPA.93 When a malfunction or deterioration is
detected, the MIL will illuminate and a diagnostic trouble
code (DTC) identifying the malfunction will be stored
in the computer for later use by a repair technician.94 The
OBD II system is more accurate than tailpipe emissions
tests because it tests the vehicle under a variety of operating
conditions as the vehicle is used.
The OBD II test begins with a preliminary inspection of
tires and components to assure the vehicle is safe to test.95
If safe, the MIL is checked to assure it is operable.96 Then,
the information from the vehicle is entered into the emissions analyzer, which evaluates the status of the OBD II
system’s vehicle monitors.97 If the vehicle’s monitors are
operating properly, the test will continue.98 If no DTCs are

86. Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines: Regulations Requiring Tampering Prevention for On-Board
Diagnostic Systems, 59 Fed. Reg. 51114 (Oct. 7, 1994).
87. Inspection/Maintenance Program Requirement—On-Board Diagnostic
Checks, 60 Fed. Reg. 43092 (Aug. 18, 1995).
88. Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines: Regulations Requiring On-Board Diagnostic (OBD) Systems—
Acceptance of Revised California OBD II Requirements, 61 Fed. Reg.
45898 (Aug. 30, 1996).
89. Id.
90. Amendments to Vehicle Inspection Maintenance Program Requirements
Incorporating the Onboard Diagnostic Check, 65 Fed. Reg. 56844
(proposed Sept. 20, 2000).
91. Amendments to Vehicle Inspection Maintenance Program Requirements
Incorporating the Onboard Diagnostic Check, 66 Fed. Reg. 18156 (Apr. 5,
2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 85).
92. Control of Air Pollution From Motor Vehicles: Tier 3 Motor Vehicle
Emission and Fuel Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. 23688 (Apr. 28, 2014).
93. 40 C.F.R. §86.1806-17(a)(8) (2015).
94. Id. §86.1806-17(b)(1).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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found, the vehicle will pass the OBD II test.99 The use of
the OBD II system makes it difficult to quantify the pollutants reduced from the I/M programs because the system’s approach is based on early discovery of malfunctions
to prevent emissions of pollutants.

III. The Role of I/M in Enforcement
of the CAA
A.

History of I/M Enforcement

The I/M program can be utilized to assist in implementing
at least three programs concerning mobile source emission
control. First, the I/M program can be used to assure the
emission controls that were incorporated into the vehicle
continue to function for the life of the vehicle, as specified in the CAA.100 I/M can be used to identify categories
of vehicles that fail to conform to the applicable emission
regulations, which can lead to EPA requiring the manufacturer to remedy the nonconformity.101 For example, heavyduty diesel-powered vehicles of MY 2007 and later have
been subject to an enforceable program for testing in-use
vehicles.102 However, there is little evidence that the I/M
program has played a significant role in implementing
these recall requirements.103
Second, the I/M program can function to catch manufacturers that use defeat devices to avoid complying with
the CAA’s provision for motor vehicle emission standards.104 Section 203(a)(1) of the CAA prohibits the sale
of vehicles that do not conform to the provisions of an
approved certificate of conformity (COC) issued by EPA
to manufacturers.105 Section 203(a)(3)(b) prohibits the use
of components intended to defeat or bypass pollution controls.106 Violators are subject to a maximum civil penalty of
$37,500 per day, adjusted for inflation.107
The “knowing violation” provision found in CAA
§113(c)(1) does not apply to mobile source violations.
However, CAA §113(c)(2) provides for criminal fines and
imprisonment for up to two years for false statements
and certifications, which includes any person who knowingly “falsifies, tampers with, renders inaccurate, or fails
to install any monitoring device or method required to
be maintained or followed under this chapter.”108 More99. Salt Lake County Health Department, Health Regulation #22, Vehicle
Emissions Control Program, §4.3.6 and app. A.
100. CAA §207, 42 U.S.C. §§207(a), 7541. The useful life of a vehicle is defined
at CAA §202(d), 42 U.S.C. §7521(d).
101. CAA §207(c), 42 U.S.C. §7541(c).
102. Control of Emissions of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: In-Use
Testing for Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines and Vehicles, 70 Fed. Reg. 34594,
34595 (June 14, 2005).
103. See generally U.S. EPA, 2012-2013 Progress Report Vehicle Engine
Compliance Activities 24 (2015) (EPA-420-R-15-007).
104. CAA §202(a), 42 U.S.C. §7521(a).
105. 42 U.S.C. §7522(a)(1).
106. Id. §7522(a)(3)(b) & (a)(1). Penalties are found at CAA §205(a), 42 U.S.C.
§7424(a).
107. The statutory penalties after adjustment for inflation are found at 40 C.F.R.
§19.4, tbl. 1 (2017).
108. CAA §113(c)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. §7413(c)(2)(C).
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over, CAA §203(a)(3)(B) makes it a violation to sell any
part or component of a motor vehicle intended to “bypass,
defeat, or render inoperative any device” installed to comply with CAA regulations.109 The criminal enforcement
provisions of CAA §113(c) appear to cover §203(a)(3)(B)
violations. The criminal provisions found in Title 18 also
may be used in cases involving CAA violations, which is
discussed below.
Since the beginning of the federal program to control
emissions from motor vehicles, numerous manufacturers have schemed to avoid complying with the mobile
source emission control requirements. Unfortunately, as
discussed below, despite I/M programs, vehicle manufacturers often have been able to avoid detection of their violations, sometimes for years. Moreover, when violations
are discovered, penalties, until recently, were not severe
enough to discourage illegal behavior. Thus, I/M programs have played a minor role in preventing violations
by the motor vehicle industry.
In 1973, EPA accused Volkswagen of selling MY
1973 vehicles that used a temperature-sensing device
to cut out pollution controls at low temperatures. Volkswagen settled for a fine of $120,000 without admitting
any wrongdoing.110 In 1995, EPA and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) accused General Motors of using
a computer chip that changed combustion parameters on
470,000 Cadillac sedans that resulted in increased emissions when the vehicles’ air conditioning and heating
were being used.111 The federal test procedure (FTP) at
that time did not include emissions testing when the air
conditioning was operating.112 EPA alleged that the vehicles were tampered with because emissions were higher
during non-FTP operational conditions.113 On November 20, 1995, General Motors agreed to recall nearly
500,000 late-model Cadillacs, pay an $11 million fine,
and establish an “emission remedial project fund” of at
least $7.05 million to be used to replace older buses and
fleet vehicles with less polluting vehicles.114 Compliance
costs totaled about $45 million.115
In 1998, EPA settled with seven heavy-duty truck
engine manufacturers that allegedly equipped their diesel
engines with “defeat devices” by installing software that
could detect when the engine was being tested under the
FTP and then control the vehicle’s combustion process to
produce legal emissions.116 When the engines were used on
109. 42 U.S.C. §7522(a)(3)(B).
110. Jeff Plungis, Carmaker Cheating on Emissions Almost as Old as Pollution Tests,
46 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2811 (Sept. 25, 2015).
111. John Cushman, Half-Million Cadillacs Recalled in Federal Pollution
Settlement, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1995.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See GM to Recall 470,000 Cadillacs, Pay Fine Over Charge That Device Raised
Emissions, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA), at AA-1 (Dec. 1, 1995).
115. Statement of Carol Browner, Administrator, U.S. EPA, DOJ/EPA Press
Conference, Settlement, GM Enforcement Action (Nov. 20, 1995),
available at 1995 WL 705249.
116. The seven manufacturers include: Caterpillar, Inc.; Cummins Engine
Co.; Detroit Diesel Corp.; Mack Trucks, Inc.; Navistar International
Transportation Corp.; Renault Vehicles Industrials, S.A.; and Volvo Truck
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the road, the engine operation would change to be more
fuel-efficient, but would produce up to three times the
legal limit of NOx.117 The companies paid a civil penalty
of $83.4 million to settle the case that led to about $1 billion in total costs to the companies.118 The manufacturers
settled separately with the California Air Resources Board
in 1998, agreeing to pay fines and fund programs to mitigate the NOx emissions that the nonconforming engines
would generate in California.119
Also in 1998, Honda was alleged to have used emissions defeat devices and paid a civil penalty of $12.6 million and incurred remedial costs of $250 million.120 Ford
Motor Co. in the same year faced similar allegations and
paid a civil penalty of $2.2 million and incurred remedial
costs estimated at $7.5 million.121 In 2005, Volkswagen was
accused of having defective emissions controls and paid a
civil penalty of $1.1 million and incurred costs of $27.9
million to fix the problem.122 Also in 2005, a similar claim
was made against DaimlerChrysler Corp., which paid a
civil penalty of $1 million and incurred about $94 million
in remedial costs.123 In 2006, Mercedes-Benz paid a civil
penalty of $1.2 million and incurred costs of $60.2 million
for vehicles with defective emissions controls.124
Corp. Press Release, DOJ, EPA Announce One Billion Dollar Settlement
With Diesel Engine Industry for Clean Air Violations (Oct. 22, 1998),
available at https://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/b1ab9f485b09897
2852562e7004dc686/93e9e651adeed6b7852566a60069ad2e?OpenDocu
ment.
117. Steven A. Herman, Clean Air Act Settlement With Diesel Engine Makers
Is Historic in Size, Scope, and Environmental Impact, 13 Nat’l Envtl.
Enforcement J. 10:18 (1998).
118. Patrick Ambrosio, EPA Expected to Seek Significant Penalty Over Volkswagen’s
Use of Defeat Devices, 46 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2902 (Oct. 2, 2015).
119. United States v. Caterpillar, 227 F. Supp. 2d 73, 77, 33 ELR 20034
(D.D.C. 2002); Carolyn Whetzel, State Regulators Criticize Slow Pace of
Manufacturers’ Effort to Retrofit Diesels, 34 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2778 (Dec. 19,
2003). Part of the settlement included a stipulation that the manufacturers
would develop software to correct the problem and install it when engines
are rebuilt or the vehicle owners request “reflashing” to reprogram a vehicle’s
computer software. Many trucks, however, were not rebuilt and the
Engine Manufacturers Association (EMA) litigated to avoid compliance.
See Marivel De La Torre et al., California Environmental
Protection Agency, Air Resources Board, Report of Enforcement
Activities: January 1-December 31, 2004, at 12 (2005) (noting that the
“mandatory reflash program will be imposed”), http://www.arb.ca.gov/enf/
reports/04enfrpt.pdf. On Oct. 16, 2006, the Superior Court of California,
County of Sacramento, ruled in favor of EMA, holding that California did
not have statutory authority to require manufacturers to develop, provide,
or install software, but the court held that the settlement agreement could
be enforced. Court Rejection of California Engine Fix Rule May Deter Other
States, 17 Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA) 21:15 (Oct. 19, 2006).
120. Honda Settles Emissions Suit, CNNMoney, June 8, 1998, http://money.cnn.
com/1998/06/08/companies/honda/index.htm.
121. Ambrosio, supra note 118, at 2904.
122. Press Release, U.S. EPA, Volkswagen of America, Inc., Agrees to Pay More
Than $1 Million for Clean Air Act Violation (June 15, 2005), available at
https://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/b1ab9f485b098972852562e70
04dc686/6946eeaadcfa982b8525702100777c0e.
123. Press Release, U.S. EPA, U.S. Announces $94 Million Clean Air Act
Settlement With Chrysler Over Emission Control Defects on 1.5 Million
Jeep and Dodge Vehicles (Dec. 21, 2005), available at https://yosemite.epa.
gov/opa/admpress.nsf/68b5f2d54f3eefd28525701500517fbf/1751045d23
87854f852570de006ea56a!OpenDocument.
124. Press Release, U.S. EPA, Mercedes-Benz Pays $1.2 Million for Clean Air
Act Violation, Also Spends $59 Million for Voluntary Recall (Dec. 21,
2006), available at https://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/198a007cc
57e64d3852570210055f3f6/03fffa1d2e87aafc8525724b005e930b!Open
Document.
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In 2014, Hyundai and Kia were accused of overstating
the fuel economy of their vehicles.125 This led to a $100 million civil penalty and at least $350 million in total costs.126
On October 8, 2016, DOJ announced a settlement with
Detroit Diesel Corp. concerning the company’s sale of
7,786 heavy-duty diesel engines in 2010 that were not certified by EPA and did not meet the applicable CAA emission standards.127 The company settled the case by agreeing
to spend $14.5 million on projects to reduce emissions and
to pay a $14 million civil penalty.128

B.

The Volkswagen Case

Despite widespread efforts by motor vehicle manufacturers to use defeat devices to avoid complying with the
CAA’s emissions requirements, the I/M program has not
been an effective tool for detecting cheating. This has
continued, as demonstrated by Volkswagen’s extensive
cheating on its CAA obligations. On September 18, 2015,
EPA announced that 482,000 Volkswagen diesel engine
vehicles sold for many years in the United States were
programmed to pass emissions tests, but when operated
under normal driving conditions, they emitted air pollutants well above the legal limit.129
This cheating was not discovered by EPA or by staterun I/M programs.130 The International Council on
Clean Transportation (ICCT), a European environmental group, wanted to have U.S. technology adopted for
European motor vehicles because Volkswagen appeared to
be meeting U.S. emission standards that were more stringent than Europe’s.131 The ICCT funded West Virginia’s
Center for Alternative Fuels, Engines, and Emissions
(CAFEE) to study emissions from real-world driving of
Volkswagen models.132 The CAFEE researchers concluded
that the vehicles’ emissions were exceeding the CAA standards by five to 35 times.133 This resulted in investigations
by EPA and California, and on September 3, 2015, Volkswagen admitted that it deliberately outfitted its cars with
defeat devices.134
Volkswagen later announced about 11 million diesel vehicles were sold worldwide with diesel engines that
125. Press Release, U.S. EPA, United States Reaches Settlement With Hyundai
and Kia in Historic Greenhouse Gas Enforcement Case (Nov. 3, 2014),
available at https://archive.epa.gov/epapages/newsroom_archive/newsreleas
es/15519081fbf4002285257d8500477615.html.
126. Ambrosio, supra note 118, at 2903.
127. Press Release, DOJ, Detroit Diesel Corporation to Pay Penalty and Reduce
Exposure to Harmful Diesel Exhaust to Resolve Clean Air Act Violations
(Oct. 6, 2016).
128. Id.
129. Volkswagen Official to Testify Before Congress, 46 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 3011
(Oct. 9, 2015).
130. Charlotte Alter, The Man Who Brought Down Volkswagen, Time, Nov. 30/
Dec. 7, 2015, at 100.
131. Dune Lawrence et al., How Could Volkswagen’s Top Engineers Not Have
Known, Bloomberg Businessweek, Oct. 26/Nov. 1, 2015, at 52.
132. Alter, supra note 130.
133. Lawrence et al., supra note 131, at 52.
134. Patrick Ambrosio, Volkswagen CEO Steps Down Amid Scandal Over
Admissions of Pollution-Test Cheating, 46 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2805 (Sept. 25,
2015).
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violate the law.135 Volkswagen inserted lines in the computer code that controls engine performance to activate
the emissions controls when driving patterns are consistent with the testing protocol. But when the vehicle’s
operation is consistent with normal road use, the engine is
programmed to maximize fuel economy, which increases
emissions dramatically.136
On January 4, 2016, DOJ filed a civil complaint against
Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche for violations involving
about 500,000 two-liter diesel engine vehicles and about
85,000 three-liter diesel engines.137 The complaint alleged
violation of the CAA’s §203(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)(A), and (a)
(3)(B).138 In addition, many states, business interests, and
individuals brought enforcement actions.139 In June 2016,
EPA’s Administrator announced a proposed partial consent
decree of its civil liability action for violations by 20092015 two-liter diesel vehicles that include a vehicle buyback program, a NOx reduction program, and a program
to advance the use of zero emissions vehicles (ZEVs).140 It
did not resolve the many private law suits, or the potential actions for CAA-based civil penalties or criminal prosecutions.141 Volkswagen also installed defeat devices on
its 2009-2016 vehicles with three-liter diesel engines. On
July 13, 2016, the California Air Resources Board rejected
Volkswagen’s proposed recall for about 85,000 three-liter
diesel vehicles sold in the United States.142

135. Arne Delfs et al., Volkswagen Will Recall 8.5M Diesels After German Agency
Takes Hard Line, 46 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 3076 (Oct. 16, 2015); Andrea
Barbara Schuessler, Volkswagen Admits Europe Manipulations, Germany’s
Transport Minister Reveals, 46 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2809 (Sept. 25, 2015).
136. Lawrence et al., supra note 131, at 52.
137. Press Release, DOJ, United States Files Complaint Against Volkswagen,
Audi, and Porsche for Alleged Clean Air Act Violations (Jan. 4,
2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-filescomplaint-against-volkswagen-audi-and-porsche-alleged-clean-air-act;
Patrick Ambrosio, Federal Government Files Lawsuit Against Volkswagen Over
Diesel Emissions Scandal, 47 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 97 (Jan. 8, 2016); Leslie
Pappas, New Jersey Latest to Sue Volkswagen Alleging Consumer Fraud, Air
Violations, 47 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 444 (Feb. 12, 2016).
138. Curt Barry, EPA Files Suit Over VW “Defeat Devices” Seeking “Significant”
Penalties, 27 Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA) 1:19 (Jan. 14, 2016).
139. By the end of October 2015, at least 80 consumer lawsuits had been filed in
the United States on behalf of consumers that purchased or leased 482,000
Volkswagen and Audi diesel vehicles. Jabeen Bhatti, Environmental Groups
Worry VW Scandal May Cripple Green “Made in Germany” Reputation,
46 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 3155 (Oct. 23, 2015). The U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transferred these consumer lawsuits to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California. On Feb. 22,
2016, three class action lawsuits were filed against Volkswagen on behalf
of (1) consumers who purchased or leased affected Volkswagen vehicles;
(2) automobile dealers who had affected diesel vehicles in their inventory on
Sept. 18, 2015; and (3) automobile dealers that competed with Volkswagen
that were disadvantaged by Volkswagen’s false marketing. Patrick Ambrosio,
Plaintiffs File Three Class Action Complaints Over Volkswagen Diesel Emissions
Cheating, 47 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 596 (Feb. 26, 2016); Margaret Cronin Fisk,
V.W. Sued by U.S. Franchise Dealers for Losses Arising From Diesel Scandal, 47
Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1031 (Apr. 8, 2016).
140. Patrick Ambrosio, “Ground-Breaking” VW Settlement Would Require as Much
as $14.7 Billion, 47 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1973 (July 1, 2016).
141. Anthony Lacey, McCarthy Says “More to Come” After Historic $24.7 Billion
VW Emissions Deal, 27 Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA) 13:11 (June 30, 2016);
Patrick Ambrosio, Civil, Criminal Charges Still Possible After $14.7 Billion
Volkswagen Diesel Settlement, 47 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1975 (July 1, 2016).
142. Carolyn Whetzel, California Rejects Volkswagen’s Recall Plan for 3-Liter
Diesels in Emissions Scandal, 47 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2141 (July 15, 2016).
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On October 25, 2016, U.S. District Court Judge Charles
Breyer approved the Volkswagen settlement of up to $10
billion to compensate consumers, $2.7 billion for environmental mitigation measures, and $2 billion to promote
ZEVs.143 Owners of approximately 475,000 Volkswagens
and Audis with two-liter engines can choose to have Volkswagen buy back their vehicles for the trade-in price on
September 15, 2015, or have the vehicle repaired.144 Volkswagen will also pay up to $332.5 million in attorney fees
and costs as well as $1.2 billion to its 652 U.S. dealers.145
In December 2016, a new agreement was proposed that
would require the three-liter diesels to be brought into
compliance or be bought back by Volkswagen, and the
company would pay another $225 million into the pollution-reduction trust fund.146 On December 20, 2016, Volkswagen reached a $1 billion settlement involving about
83,000 MY 2009-2016 Audi, Volkswagen, and Porsche
vehicles with three-liter diesel engines.147 It appears that the
three-liter diesel vehicles can be fixed, which will avoid the
costs of a buyback program.148
On September 9, 2016, a former Volkswagen engineer, James Liang, pleaded guilty to conspiring to defraud
the United States and violate the CAA, which was the
first criminal case to develop from Volkswagen’s cheating.149 He is cooperating with prosecutors.150 On February 23, 2017, a Volkswagen engineer, Oliver Schmidt, was
arrested while on vacation in Florida and charged with
fraud and conspiracy.151 He pleaded guilty on August 11,
2017, in the federal District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan, and sentencing is scheduled for December 6,
2017.152 Other Volkswagen employees have been indicted,
but they are in Germany and are protected from extradition.153 On April 21, 2017, Volkswagen agreed to pay a
143. There is a separate agreement with California that involves Volkswagen
spending $800 million over 10 years to help build the state’s zero-emission
infrastructure and support the electric vehicle market. As of July 2017, the
details of the agreement were still being negotiated. See Carolyn Whetzel,
VW Revamps Zero-Emissions Vehicle Plan to Woo California, Daily Env’t Rep.
(BNA) (July 3, 2017).
144. Sudhin Thanawala & Tom Krisher, Judge Approves $15 Billion VW EmissionsCheating Settlement, Salt Lake Trib., Oct. 26, 2016, at A3.
145. Kartikay Mehrotra, VW, Dealers Propose $1.2 Billion Agreement for Losses
From Emissions-Cheating Scandal, 47 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2865 (Oct. 7,
2016).
146. David LaRoss, EPA Reaches New Pact With Volkswagen, Class Settlement
Likely, 27 Clean Air Rep. (Inside EPA) 26:8 (Dec. 29. 2016).
147. Kartikay Mehrotra, VW Reaches Deal for Emissions-Cheating Audi, Porsche
Models, Law Energy & Climate Rep. (BNA) (Dec. 21, 2016).
148. LaRoss, supra note 146.
149. Tom Schoenberg et al., Veteran Volkswagen Engineer Is First Charged in U.S.
Diesel Emissions Probe, 47 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2687 (Sept. 16, 2016).
150. Jamie Butters et al., Volkswagen Pleads Guilty in U.S. Emissions-Cheating
Scandal, Law Energy & Climate Rep. (BNA) (Mar. 10, 2017).
151. Margaret Cronin Fisk & Keith Naughton, VW Executive Pleads Not Guilty
as 5 Avoid U.S. Diesel Case, Law Energy & Climate Rep. (BNA) (Feb. 23,
2017).
152. Margaret Cronin Fisk & Brian Louis, VW Executive Schmidt Pleads Guilty in
Auto Emissions Scandal, Env’t Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 11, 2017).
153. Id. Giovanni Pamio, an Italian living in Germany, was the eighth person
charged by DOJ. He is not a German citizen, which means he could
be subject to extradition, but he was arrested in Germany, which takes
precedence over the U.S. charges. Karin Matussek & Christoph Rauwald,
Ex-Audi Manager Charged in U.S. Over VW Emissions Scandal, Daily Env’t
Rep. (BNA) (July 10, 2017).
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criminal fine of $2.8 billion and civil penalties of $1.5 billion for misleading U.S. regulators and customers.154 On
May 19, 2017, EPA approved Volkswagen’s fix for 84,391
MY 2012-2014 Passat sedans with two-liter diesel engines
and automatic transmissions.155
However, as of July 2017, no criminal indictments of
any senior Volkswagen executives have been announced,
although the DOJ investigation continues. Volkswagen’s
chief executive officer, Martin Winterkorn, is also under
investigation in Germany.156 Criminal penalties imposed
against corporate executives have an important role to play
when the management is willing to risk the organizations’
assets in order to make a profit. Moreover, criminal penalties are unmatched for their deterrent effect, and a single
successful criminal prosecution may result in improved
compliance by an entire industry.157 Nevertheless, no senior
executive in the automotive industry has ever been criminally prosecuted for tampering violations of the CAA.
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ate whether to bring suit against an individual based on
considerations beyond that individual’s ability to pay.159

(1) in order to qualify for any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the Department all relevant facts
relating to the individuals responsible for the misconduct;
(2) criminal and civil corporate investigations should
focus on individuals from the inception of the investigation; (3) criminal and civil attorneys handling corporate
investigations should be in routine communication with
one another; (4) absent extraordinary circumstances or
approved departmental policy, the Department will not
release culpable individuals from civil or criminal liability
when resolving a matter with the corporation; (5) Department attorneys should not resolve matters with a corporation without a clear plan to resolve related individual cases,
and should memorialize any declinations as to individuals
in such cases; and (6) civil attorneys should consistently
focus on individuals as well as the company and evalu-

The Yates Memo may have signaled a more-aggressive
posture by DOJ toward individuals violating the CAA.
However, it is not clear if this aggressiveness applies to
senior executives. After the release of the Yates Memo, EPA
brought an enforcement action against the Harley-Davidson Motor Co. for selling more than 324,000 parts (“super
tuners”) designed to defeat the emission control on highway
motorcycles.160 On August 18, 2016, the case was settled
with a consent decree that requires the defendants to pay a
civil penalty of $12 million, spend $3 million to reduce air
pollution, and comply, in the future, with CAA requirements to include obtaining a valid COC before introducing into commerce a new motorcycle.161 In July 2017, DOJ
dropped the $3 million penalty based on a new policy of
U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, but this action will
require a revised consent decree to be approved by a federal
judge.162 This exercise of prosecutorial discretion stands in
contrast to the penalties, discussed below, that have been
imposed on mechanics working as I/M inspectors.
In May 2017, DOJ announced it planned to sue Fiat
Chrysler Automobiles NV for installing illegal defeat
devices, which carries a potential penalty of $4.6 billion.163
On May 23, 2017, the United States brought a civil action
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against FCA US LLC, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles NV,
VM Motori S.p.A., and VM North America, Inc.164 The
action seeks injunctive relief and civil penalties for violating CAA §§204 and 205 and the related regulations.165 The
defendants allegedly sold approximately 103,828 MY 20142016 diesel-fueled new motor vehicles under the Ram 1500
and Jeep Grand Cherokee model names. The defendants
allegedly used at least eight software-based features called
auxiliary emission control devices (AECDs) that were not
included in the disclosures made as part of the COC applications. The defendants allegedly installed AECDs that
caused the emission control system to underperform or
shut off unless the vehicle was operating within the parameters of the federal emission tests. The use of these AECDs
resulted in the vehicles emitting substantially higher levels
of NOx during normal driving conditions than during federal emission tests.
A new motor vehicle containing an AECD that was
not disclosed results in the vehicle not being covered by
the COC, which means it is prohibited from being sold
in the United States.166 Moreover, no new vehicle may be

154. Margaret Cronin Fisk & Tom Schoenberg, VW’s $4.3 Billion U.S. Deal
Completed With Court’s Approval, Law Energy & Climate Rep. (BNA) (Apr.
21, 2017).
155. Ryan Beene, U.S. Regulators Approve Emissions Fix for Volkswagen Diesels,
Law Energy & Climate Rep. (BNA) (May 19, 2017).
156. Fisk & Naughton, supra note 151.
157. See generally Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Air Pollution Control and
Climate Change Mitigation Law 308-10, 318-19 (2d. ed 2010).
158. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney General, DOJ
(Sept. 9, 2015) (Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing),
available at https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download.

159. Id.
160. United States v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., No. 16-1687 (D.D.C. Aug. 18,
2016).
161. Id.
162. David Shepardson, U.S. Justice Department Drops $3 Million HarleyDavidson Emissions Penalty, Reuters, July 20, 2017.
163. Ryan Beene et al., U.S. Said to Ready Lawsuit Over Fiat Chrysler Diesel
Emissions, Env’t Rep. (BNA) (May 19, 2017).
164. United States v. FCA US LLC et al., No. 2:17-cv-11633-JCO-EAS (E.D.
Mich. May 23, 2017).
165. 42 U.S.C. §§7523, 7524; 40 C.F.R. pt. 86 (2017).
166. CAA §203(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §7522(a)(1).

C.

Enforcement Against Corporations
and Individuals

After decades of actions by the automotive companies to
cheat on emissions requirements, EPA and DOJ appeared
to be moving to a more-aggressive enforcement position.
On September 9, 2015, DOJ released its memorandum
“Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing” over the signature of Deputy Attorney General Sally
Quillian Yates.158 The Yates Memo reflected a policy shift
to strengthen the efforts to pursue individual corporate
wrongdoers based on six key steps. They are as follows:
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equipped with a defeat device, as defined at 40 C.F.R.
§86.1803-01. In addition, the CAA makes it illegal to
remove emission control devices or to use any device
intended to bypass, defeat, or render inoperative any
device used to control emissions.167
Pursuant to CAA §203(a)(1) and (a)(3)(A), violations are
subject to penalties of up to $37,500 per motor vehicle for
violations prior to November 3, 2015, and $45,268 for each
violation occurring on or after that date. The violation of
§203(a)(3)(B), involving the sale or installation of defeat
devices, provides for penalties that are 10% of the penalties
of §203(a)(1) and (a)(3)(A).168
It is apparent that the I/M program has not played more
than a minor role in assuring compliance by the automotive industry with the CAA’s emission control requirements. The automotive industry’s cheating has been too
sophisticated for the states to control through their I/M
programs. Thus, the I/M program is focused on its third
role, which is to prevent tampering and assure that vehicles
in the hands of consumers continue to control emissions in
a manner consistent with the manufacturer’s COC.
For many years, the I/M program was based on tailpipe tests. These tests were relatively easy to thwart and
enforcement actions were rare. With the development of
more-sophisticated motor vehicle technology and the use
of OBD-based testing, it became more difficult to cheat
on the tests and it became easier to successfully bring
enforcement actions against violators. However, although
the CAA is a complex and comprehensive statute, Congress did not provide strong criminal sanctions for violating I/M provisions.
Title II of the CAA provides only civil penalties for tampering with motor vehicle emissions controls. I/M is primarily the responsibility of the states, with EPA regulations
requiring specified processes to be instituted by the states
and approved by EPA. Most states provide civil penalties
and/or misdemeanor penalties for I/M violations.169 DOJ
has increased its enforcement efforts since about 2009 by
bringing actions based on the more general and ambiguous
provisions of the federal criminal code found in Title 18
of the U.S. Code, which provides more-stringent penalties. Some of the statutes that potentially may be applied
include crimes against the United States (18 U.S.C. §2);
a false claim (18 U.S.C. §287); conspiracy to commit
offense or to defraud the United States (18 U.S.C. §371);
false statements made to the U.S. government (18 U.S.C.
§1001); mail fraud (18 U.S.C. §1341); fraud by wire, radio,
or television (18 U.S.C. §1343); and obstruction of justice
(18 U.S.C. §§1503, 1505, 1510, 1512-1514, and 1517-1519).
Under 18 U.S.C. §1503, the government does not have
to prove actual obstruction of justice, only the intent to
obstruct justice.170
167. CAA §203(a)(3)(A) & (B), 42 U.S.C. §7522(a)(3)(A) & (B).
168. 42 U.S.C. §7522(a).
169. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. §32:1312, Civil Penalties; Salt Lake County Health
Department, Health Regulation #22, app. B.
170. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995).

10-2017

The Yates Memo makes it clear that a corporation
seeking credit for cooperation when penalties are being
negotiated must identify all individuals involved in or
responsible for the misconduct, regardless of their status
or seniority.171 As discussed below, nearly all the I/M criminal enforcement actions brought by DOJ have involved
prosecutions of low-level criminals who are almost always
emissions inspectors.
On June 29, 2011, three inspectors at an emissions
inspection station in Georgia were sentenced for issuing
more than 1,400 fraudulent emissions certificates in violation of Georgia’s law, for which they received payment well
in excess of the going rate for an emissions test.172 One of
the defendants was sentenced to two years of incarceration,
followed by one year of supervised release, because of his
prior criminal history. A second defendant was sentenced
to 180 days of home confinement, as part of a two-year
term of probation, and 50 hours of community service. A
third defendant was sentenced to 120 hours of home confinement as part of a two-year term of probation.173
On April 9, 2012, a licensed North Carolina emissions
inspector, of Durham, North Carolina, pleaded guilty to
conspiring to violate the CAA and to making false statements.174 He used a surrogate vehicle (“clean scanning”)
rather than the customers’ vehicles, which would have
failed the emissions inspection, in order to falsely pass
353 vehicles.175
In 2012, five defendants in Charlotte, North Carolina,
were sentenced for using a device to bypass the OBD system and provide false information that allowed the vehicles
to pass an I/M test.176 The defendants were subject to probation and/or home detention, and/or community service
and fines, but two defendants received prison sentences of
60 days and five months.177 One of the defendants used an
illegally purchased OBD II simulator to falsify emissions
in violation of North Carolina’s vehicle emissions program
for which he was sentenced to 24 months’ probation, which
included six months of home detention, and was ordered to
perform 150 hours of community service.178
On October 19, 2012, two defendants were sentenced
for conducting false vehicle inspections at two repair shops
in Charlotte, North Carolina.179 One of the defendants,
a licensed inspector, conducted 236 false vehicle inspections using a surrogate vehicle to produce false passing
results, for which he was fined $7,500, given three months
in prison followed by three months of home confinement,
and ordered to serve 50 hours of community service.180 The
171. Steven A. Lauer, Corporate Officers Take Note: Justice Department Is Telling
U.S. Attorneys to Aim High, 47 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 869 (Mar. 18, 2016).
172. DOJ, Environmental Crimes Section Monthly Bulletin 22 (Aug. 2011).
173. Id.
174. U.S. EPA, Environmental Crimes Bulletin 6 (Apr. 2012).
175. Id.
176. U.S. EPA, Environmental Crimes Bulletin 9 (Oct. 2012); DOJ, Environmental
Crimes Section Monthly Bulletin 11 (Aug. 2011).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. U.S. EPA, Environmental Crimes Bulletin 8 (Oct. 2012).
180. Id.
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other defendant was a licensed inspector and the owneroperator of a repair facility who used surrogate vehicles
to falsely pass cars that would otherwise have failed the
emissions inspection, for which he was paid.181 He was sentenced to four months in prison to be followed by four
months of home confinement, and he was ordered to serve
50 hours of community service.182
Because these defendants participated in providing false
certification of the emissions inspection requirements,
they are guilty of violating CAA §113(c)(2)(A). Some of
these defendants used equipment to provide false data
that allowed the vehicles to pass inspection. There is no
indication that any person who supplied the equipment
to improperly pass vehicles that would otherwise fail was
prosecuted. Such a person would appear not to be covered
by §113(c)(2)(A), which is why the government would seek
to use Title 18.
The government rarely brings criminal actions against
executives of large corporations for violations of environmental laws. The CAA provides criminal, civil, and
administrative penalties for violation of its provisions in
§113.183 It does not explain when the various enforcement
options should be used. In theory, any violation that meets
the minimal mental state required for a knowing violation
could lead to civil or criminal prosecution, or both. The use
of the CAA’s criminal provisions is largely dependent on
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
The exercise of the power to bring a criminal action
should be based on (1) the significance of the adverse environmental impact or the extent of harm to the public’s
health; (2) the deceptiveness of the conduct; (3) the extent
to which the defendant flouted the law; and (4) the repetitiveness of the violations or other aggravating factors.184
Criminal prosecution should not be used for technical
violations of complex environmental laws, but intentional
harmful actions by corporate executives should result in
their criminal prosecution. However, criminal prosecution
of individuals for violation of the CAA’s emission control
requirements appears more random than principled.

In Utah, on-road sources are responsible for 36% of
the statewide CO emissions, 33% of the NOx, 8% of the
particulate matter smaller than 10 micrometers (PM10),
17% of the particulate matter smaller than 2.5 micrometers (PM2.5), 1% of the sulfur oxide (SOx), and 3% of the
VOCs.187 Because much of the motor vehicle use is concentrated in the areas of the state that are designated as
nonattainment, the percentage of the pollutants contributed in those areas by motor vehicles should be expected
to be much higher. The impact of pollutant emissions on
ambient air quality is exacerbated by the topography of
the state, which helps create the atmospheric conditions
that result in poor air quality, especially during the winter months.188
The I/M program is applicable to nonattainment areas
that are not in compliance with the CAA for pollutants
related to automotive emissions.189 In Utah, the PM2.5 nonattainment areas of primary concern are located along the
Wasatch Front from Ogden to Salt Lake City to Provo, but
part of Cache County is also a nonattainment area that
extends into Franklin County, Idaho.190 On April 28, 2017,
EPA classified the Provo and Salt Lake City metropolitan
areas as well as Davis and Weber Counties and parts of
Box Elder and Toole Counties as serious PM2.5 nonattainment areas, which will require a modified SIP be submitted
to EPA.191 Salt Lake and Utah Counties are also nonattainment for PM10.192 Salt Lake County and East Tooele
County above 5,400 feet are nonattainment for sulfur
dioxide (SO2).193
If a nonattainment area achieves compliance with
NAAQS, it must develop and implement a 10-year maintenance plan that must be approved by EPA.194 In 1997,
pursuant to CAA §107(d)(3)(E), EPA designated Salt
Lake and Davis Counties as having attained the O3 standard, and it approved a maintenance plan, but that status
may soon be changed to nonattainment.195 Davis County,
Salt Lake County, and portions of Duchesne, Tooele,
Uintah, Utah, and Weber Counties failed to meet the

IV.

The I/M Program in Utah

A.

Overview

187. Utah Division of Air Quality, 2015 Annual Report 23-25 (2016).
VOCs from motor vehicles are an important source of anthropogenic
emissions, but in Utah, biogenic sources release 74% of the VOCs. Id. at 25.
188. Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Utah’s Fine Particulate Air Pollution Control Program,
2014 Utah L. Rev. Online 113 (2014), available at https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=361683.
189. CAA §§181(a)(2)(B), (b)(4), (c)(3), 187(a)(4) & (6), 42 U.S.C. §§7511a(a)
(2)(B), (b)(4), (c)(3), 7512a(4) & (6).
190. Utah Division of Air Quality, supra note 187. Part of Cache, Box
Elder, Weber, Tooele, and all of Davis, Salt Lake, and Utah Counties are
nonattainment for PM2.5.
191. Emma Penrod, EPA: Unmet Air-Pollution Standards Now “Serious,” Salt
Lake Trib., May 3, 2017, at B1; Emma Penrod, Utah Air Quality Failures to
Get “Serious” Status, Salt Lake Trib., Dec. 17, 2016, at A1.
192. Id.
193. Utah Division of Air Quality, supra note 187, at 6.
194. CAA §175A, 42 U.S.C. §7505a.
195. Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; State of
Utah; Salt Lake and Davis Counties Ozone Redesignation to Attainment,
Designation of Areas for Air Quality Planning Purposes, Approval of Related
Elements, Approval of Partial NOx RACT Exemption, and Approval of
Weber County I/M Program, 62 Fed. Reg. 38213 (July 17, 1997). See also
62 Fed. Reg. 28396 (May 23, 1997). But see Emma Penrod, Utah’s 2017
Resolution: A Plan for Cleaner Air, Salt Lake Trib., Jan. 16, 2017, at A1.

Although the pollution from individual mobile sources has
declined, mobile source emissions are a leading cause of
air pollution.185 The steady increase in the number of miles
traveled nullifies some of the benefits of reduced vehicle
emissions per mile that are driven by EPA’s emissions
requirements for new motor vehicles.186
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 42 U.S.C. §7413.
184. David Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime, 45 ELR
10801 (Aug. 2015).
185. See generally Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Mobile Source Air Pollution Control, 6
Envtl. Law. 309 (2000).
186. Id.
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more stringent 2015 O3 NAAQS.196 Utah’s Department
of Environmental Quality (DEQ) proposed designating
three nonattainment areas for O3.197 The Wasatch Front
has also had problems with CO emissions that led to I/M
program requirements.198
The I/M provisions are found in the Utah SIP, §X,
Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Program.199 Part A
includes the general requirements; Part B covers Davis
County; Part C covers Salt Lake County; Part D covers
Utah County; Part E covers Weber County; and Part F
applies to Cache County.200 However, Utah delegates
implementation to the health department of nonattainment counties, as discussed below.201 The I/M program is
designed to meet the CAA’s specific requirements applicable to nonattainment areas, but it is also utilized as a
control measure to attain and maintain the particulate
NAAQS for PM2.5 and PM10 in Cache, Davis, Salt Lake,
Utah, and Weber Counties.202
In 2015, EPA approved amendments to Utah’s SIP
that modified the general requirements of Utah’s I/M
program and approved the addition of §X, Part F to add
an I/M program for Cache County.203 The I/M program
is countywide, although only part of the county is nonattainment for PM2.5. The I/M program in Cache County
is not mandated by the CAA, but has been adopted by
Utah as part of its attainment demonstration for Cache
County in order to reduce PM2.5 precursor emissions of
NOx and VOCs.204
There is a separate I/M program for diesel-powered
vehicles. On July 12, 1995, the Utah Air Quality Board
adopted a diesel I/M program.205 Appendix 2 of §XXI is
applicable to Davis County; Appendix 3 is applicable to
Salt Lake County; and Appendix 4 applies to Utah Coun196. Emma Penrod, Ozone: Utah Seeks Fed’s Help, Salt Lake Trib., Oct. 18,
2016, at A1.
197. Id. See also Penrod, Utah Air Quality Failures to Get “Serious” Status,
supra note 191, at A4. The nonattainment areas are Western Utah
County; Salt Lake and Davis Counties, the western portion of Weber
County, and the more populated area of Toole County; and parts of
Duchesne and Uintah Counties.
198. Salt Lake City has been redesignated as being in attainment for the CO
standard and became CO maintenance areas. In 2005, EPA approved a
revised CO maintenance plan and a revised I/M program for Salt Lake City.
Provo was redesignated as attainment in 2005, and the I/M program for
Utah County was approved. Ogden, which was redesignated as attainment
for CO in 2001, had its maintenance plan revised on Sept. 14, 2005, in an
EPA approval that also included the approval of the revised I/M program for
Weber County. Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation
Plans; State of Utah; Ogden City Revised Carbon Monoxide Maintenance
Plan and Approval of Related Revisions, 70 Fed. Reg. 54267 (Sept. 14,
2005).
199. Utah Admin. Code R307-110-31 (2016), Vehicle Inspection and
Maintenance Program.
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., Salt Lake County Health Department, Health Regulation #22a,
Vehicle Inspection/Maintenance.
202. Utah SIP, §X, Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Program (adopted by
the Utah Air Quality Board Dec. 5, 2012).
203. Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; State of
Utah; Motor Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance and Associated Revisions,
80 Fed. Reg. 54237 (Sept. 9, 2015).
204. Id.
205. Utah SIP, §XXI, Diesel Inspection and Maintenance Program (July 12,
1995).
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ty.206 Utah County, however, ended its diesel I/M program
in 2006.207 This program was developed to control PM10
emissions. Heavy-duty and light-duty diesel vehicles must
meet opacity standards specified in Appendix 5 of SIP
§XXI. Light-duty diesel vehicles must meet cutpoints, or
allowable emissions, designed to achieve a 10% reduction
in diesel particulates.208 Violations may result in a penalty
of $299 per violation pursuant to Utah Administrative
Code Rule R307-4.209
Each of the counties has implementing ordinances.
There are data that indicate that diesel vehicles fail I/M
inspections more often than gasoline-powered vehicles.
Salt Lake County fails about 6% of the diesel vehicles;
about one-half the failures are because the emissions systems have been deliberately disabled.210 In Morgan and
Weber Counties about 4.5% of the gasoline vehicles fail,
but 15% percent of the diesel vehicles fail, with about 40%
of the failed vehicles showing evidence of tampering.211
In Weber County, however, the diesel I/M program only
began on January 1, 2017, and there is one waiver for any
vehicle failing the test in 2017 or 2018.212

B.

Implementation of I/M in Utah

Utah’s I/M programs are health-based programs that are
administered by local health departments.213 Counties with
I/M programs may use standardized computerized I/M
testing equipment, adopt standardized emission standards,
and provide for reciprocity.214 Utah’s basic I/M program is
based on EPA’s amended I/M regulations.215 Since 2002,
OBD checks and OBD-related repairs are required as a
routine component of Utah I/M programs on MY 1996
and newer LDVs and LDTs equipped with certified OBD
systems.216 The federal performance standard requires
repair of malfunctions or system deterioration identified
by or affecting OBD systems.217
Utah’s I/M programs are funded through several
mechanisms including, but not limited to, a fee collected
at the time of registration by the Utah Tax Commission
Division of Motor Vehicles or the county assessor’s office,
which is remitted to the county in which the vehicle is
206. Id.
207. Emma Penrod, Emissions Testing That Targets Utah County Is Near Passage,
Salt Lake Trib., Mar. 3, 2017, at A5.
208. Utah SIP, supra note 205, §XXI.
209. Id.
210. Penrod, supra note 207.
211. Id.
212. Weber Morgan Health Department, Weber County I/M Bulletin (Nov. 7,
2016), available at http://www.webermorganhealth.org/environmentalhealth/pdf/IM%20Bulletin%20diesel.pdf.
213. The authority is found at Utah Code §41-6a-1642 (2017). Davis and
Salt Lake Counties started their I/M programs in 1984, followed by Utah
County in 1986, and Weber County in 1990. 62 Fed. Reg. 38213-02 (July
17, 1997).
214. Utah Code §41-6a-1643 (2005).
215. Amendments to Vehicle Inspection Maintenance Program Requirements
Incorporating the Onboard Diagnostic Check, 66 Fed. Reg. 18156 (Apr. 5,
2001).
216. CAA §202(m)(3), 42 U.S.C. §7521(m)(3).
217. Id.
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registered.218 The collection of fees for various permitting activities and the selling of inspection certificates to
inspection stations are the other funding mechanisms.219
In 1994, the legislature provided that counties are to
give preference to decentralized testing facilities and to use
the most cost-effective means to achieve and maintain the
maximum benefit with regard to air quality standards and
to meet federal air quality requirements related to motor
vehicles.220 This has resulted in Utah having only decentralized test-and-repair facilities.
In 2002, Utah’s statute was amended to allow for
inspections every other year for vehicles that are six years
old or newer on January 1 each year.221 Therefore, vehicles
less than two years old on January 1 of any year are exempt
from an I/M inspection. In 2005, the legislature allowed
counties with an I/M program to require college students
and employees who park a motor vehicle on a college or
university campus that is not registered in a county subject
to emission inspection to provide proof of compliance with
an emission inspection.222 Only Cache County requires
compliance by college students.223

C.

Salt Lake County’s Program

As previously discussed, Utah’s air pollution control program is based on a revised SIP that includes a vehicle
inspection program in its §X. The section has subdivisions
applicable to the counties subject to an I/M requirement.224
County health departments have promulgated additional
I/M regulations because implementation of the I/M program has been delegated to the counties. The I/M program
is therefore a mix of federal, state, and local law. The Salt
Lake County Health Department’s regulation #22, Vehicle Emissions Control Program, is authorized by the Utah
Code and is typical of the approach used in other counties
in Utah.225
Salt Lake County implements the I/M program using
more than 400 vehicle inspection stations.226 The county’s
regulation applies to owners of motor vehicles in Salt Lake
County; publicly owned vehicles operated in the county;
owners, operators, and managers of I/M stations; and
I/M inspectors and suppliers of analyzer equipment and
gas calibrations.227 Analyzers include the OBD scanner.228
Gaseous or liquid petroleum-powered vehicles of MY 1968
or newer; light- and medium-duty diesel-powered vehicles
218. 62 Fed. Reg. 38213-02 (July 17, 1997). Utah Code §41-6a-1642(10)
(2016).
219. 62 Fed. Reg. 38213-02 (July 17, 1997).
220. Utah Code §41-6a-1642(2)(c) (2016).
221. Id. at §41-6a-1642(6)(b) (2002).
222. Id. §41-6a-1642(5) (2005).
223. Bear River Health Department, Regulation No. 2013-1, §6.3.
224. See supra note 202-03 and accompanying text.
225. Utah Code §26A-1-114 (2016).
226. Applus Automotive, Success Stories: Salt Lake & Weber County Utah
Vehicle-Emissions Testing Programmes, http://www.applusautomotive.com/
en/successStory/Salt_Lake_&_Weber_County_Utah_vehicle-emissions_
testing_programmes-1340209435611 (last visited Aug. 3, 2017).
227. Salt Lake County Health Department, Health Regulation #22, §1.1.
228. Id. §2.4.
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of MY 1998 and newer; and specified heavy-duty dieselpowered vehicles are required to pass an I/M inspection.229
Vehicles six years and older must be inspected annually;
newer vehicles are inspected every other year.230
The inspection measures the emissions of HC and CO
based on a two-speed idle test (TSI), opacity and/or an
OBD II test, as well as a visual inspection of the emission
control systems.231 The cutpoints are based on the weight,
class, and MY of the vehicle and are found in Appendix
C of the regulation.232 TSI inspections are required for
MY 1968-1995 light-duty, non-diesel vehicles and for MY
1968 and newer medium-duty and heavy-duty non-diesel
vehicles.233 Non-diesel vehicles of MY 1996 and newer and
MY 1998 and newer light-duty and medium-duty diesel
vehicles are subject to OBD inspections and a visual tampering inspection.234 There are separate I/M provisions for
heavy-duty diesel vehicles that are applicable only in Salt
Lake County.235
If a vehicle fails an I/M inspection and the failure cannot
be repaired for a specified cost ($450 for 1996 and newer
non-diesel vehicles), it may be eligible for a waiver.236 Violators of the I/M regulation are subject to criminal, civil,
and administrative enforcement actions.237 Most I/M violations are a Class B misdemeanor pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §26A-a-123.238 A penalty schedule is found in
the regulation’s Appendix B.239
In Salt Lake County, I/M inspections increased from
437,888 in 2006 to 686,672 in 2015, with 532,526 performed in the first nine months of 2016.240 The I/M inspections are based on testing the OBD system for newer cars
while older vehicles without an OBD system are subject to
a TSI test.241 As new vehicles replace old vehicles, the percentage of tests based on the OBD system increases, and in
2015, 87.26% of the tests only involved OBD testing. The
failure rate for the I/M test was 4.6% in 2015 and 4.11% in
the first nine months of 2016.242
Assuming the average cost of an I/M test for vehicle
owners is $25, the cost to Salt Lake County vehicle owners
in 2015 was $17,166,800. Since 31,609 vehicles failed the
test, simple arithmetic demonstrates the cost for each vehicle that fails the I/M test is more than $543. If we assume
it takes an hour to have a vehicle tested and the driver’s
time is worth $15 an hour, the additional cost to Salt Lake
County residents in 2015 was $10,299,780 (686,652 mul229. Id. §4.1.8. Certain vehicles are exempted by §4.1.7.
230. Utah Code §41-6-163(6) (2016).
231. Salt Lake County Health Department, Health Regulation #22, §§2.36,
2.58. OBD is defined at §2.47.
232. Id. §§2.17, 4.1.4.
233. Id. app. A §3.2.3.
234. Id. app. A §3.2.3(3).
235. Id. app. D.
236. Id. §4.4.
237. Id. §7.
238. Id. §8.1.
239. Id. app. D.
240. Data supplied to the author by Ed C. Jensen, an air pollution control
specialist with the Salt Lake County Health Department, Sept. 23, 2016.
241. Salt Lake County Health Department, Health Regulation #22, §2.36.
242. See supra note 240.
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tiplied by $15). The total cost is more than $27 million,
or about $869 per vehicle failed. This does not include the
cost of repairing failed vehicles, but that information is
unavailable. It also does not include the cost of administering and enforcing the I/M program. Is the program worth
the cost?
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One of the issues surrounding the I/M program in Utah,
and throughout the country, is the inability to calculate
the effectiveness of the I/M programs. As this Article has
demonstrated, the I/M program has had minimal effectiveness in detecting and/or dealing with the failures of
manufacturers to build vehicles that continue to meet
federal emission requirements. The value of this program
therefore depends on its ability to reduce emissions from
in-use vehicles.
In the early days of the I/M program, it was easier to estimate the tons of pollutants reduced because emissions were
measured during the I/M test. After OBD became nearly
universally installed in U.S. vehicles, emissions generally are
not tested, and even if they are, it is unlikely that they would
be excessive compared to vehicles manufactured in the past.
Moreover, in states similar to Utah, where only five counties have I/M programs, some residents may register their
vehicles in a county that does not require an I/M inspection.
In 1997, when EPA approved Utah’s I/M program, it
had to make a judgment that the program would help the
state meet its CAA obligations.243 This could have included
a quantification of the expected benefits, but it did not. The
legal requirements for Utah’s SIP included an emissions
inventory that showed total emissions were less than or
equal to the 1994 emissions. Thus, the emissions for point
sources, area sources, on-road mobile sources with I/M
programs in place, and nonroad sources were aggregated.
Emissions without I/M were not calculated, which means
the reduction benefits of I/M could not be determined, but
Utah did model on-road benefits of enhanced I/M over
basic I/M.244
Although there have been many updates to the I/M
program, there has not been any new quantification of the
emissions reductions attributable to the program. However, in 2015, Utah’s Division of Air Quality used EPA’s

approved on-road emissions model, MOVES2014a, to
estimate the emissions reduction from on-road vehicles.245
It estimated that the I/M program resulted in emissions
reductions in Salt Lake County of 9,354 tons per year
(tpy) for CO, 851 tpy for NOx, and 653 tpy for VOCs.246
Because the pollutants of interest to the state are primarily
NOx and VOCs, the cost of the I/M program divided by
the reductions in these pollutants results in a crude cost
estimate of nearly $18,000 per ton.247 The cost is higher if
we include the cost of repairing the failed vehicles, but that
information is unavailable. Additional costs are incurred to
administer and enforce the I/M program.
For comparison, EPA’s 2016 Cross-State Air Pollution
Update for the 2008 Ozone NAAQS determined that the
estimated marginal cost of $1,400 per ton for the control
of electric power-generated NOx is a cost-effective control
strategy.248 In its 2013 PM2.5 SIP, the Utah DEQ estimated
the costs to reduce 2017 emissions in the Salt Lake area by
43.1 tons per day.249 Area source controls were expected to
cost between $238 and $6,560 per ton of reduction.250 On
May 23, 2017, Utah’s Division of Air Quality proposed
new VOC controls for eight area sources encaged in coating operations as part of its upcoming serious PM2.5 SIP
revision. The staff analysis found the cost of removing a ton
of VOC ranged from $1,878 to $3,658, with an average
cost of $2,596.251 Point sources are required to install controls at a cost of $1,357 to $23,319 per ton of reduction.252
As an example of the high costs of compliance, when the
Holly refinery upgraded its facility in 2013, it estimated
the cost per ton of emissions from its flare gas recovery
system at $141,082.07 per ton for NOx and $151,494.03
per ton of VOC reduction.253
Thus, I/M costs, although significantly higher than
most area source controls, when compared to other stationary source compliance costs, are not the only sources to
have high costs imposed. After a half-century of effort to
control air emissions, additional emissions reductions are
often costly. However, the benefits of the I/M program are
not well-documented.
The cost per ton of emissions reduction due to I/M programs can be quantified, but the effort involves making
assumptions that will affect the result. However, because
the emissions reductions from I/M are largely unknown,
benefits are difficult to quantify. I/M may help force the

243. Proposed Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Improvement Plans;
State of Utah; Salt Lake and Davis Counties Ozone Redesignation to
Attainment, Designation of Areas for Air Quality Planning Purposes,
Proposed Approval of Related Elements, Proposal Approval of Partial NOx,
RACT Exemption, and Proposed Approval of Weber County I/M Program,
62 Fed. Reg. 28396 (May 23, 1997).
244. Letter from Timothy Russ, Environmental Scientist, EPA Region 8, to the
author (Nov. 9, 2016). More details can be found at Proposed Approval
and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; State of Utah; Salt
Lake and Davis Counties Ozone Redesignation to Attainment, Designation
of Areas for Air Quality Planning Purposes, Proposed Approval of Related
Elements, Proposed Approval of Partial NOx RACT Exemption and
Approval of Weber County I/M Program, 62 Fed. Reg. 28396 (May 23,
1997). The proposal showed reductions in VOC emissions in tons per day
from 75.40 in 1994 to 56.47 in 2007 and reductions in NOx from 73.66 to
67.31. These reductions assumed the use of I/M. Id. at 28405.

245. Letter from Richard McKeague III, Transportation Planner/Air Quality
Modeler, Utah Division of Air Quality, to the author (Oct. 31, 2016).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 81 Fed. Reg. 74504, 74508 (Oct. 26, 2016).
249. Information Sheet, Utah DEQ Division of Air Quality, PM2.5 State
Implementation Plan (SIP): Salt Lake and Provo SIPs (Sept. 2013).
250. Id.
251. Memorandum to the Air Quality Board (May 23, 2017) (on file
with author).
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public to confront the impact their vehicles have on mobile
source air pollution, which is the major source of air pollutants in most nonattainment areas. To the extent this
motivates behavior, the I/M program may result in better maintenance of vehicles, but this possible benefit is not
quantifiable. The nature of the OBD check is to detect
vehicle malfunctions early and have them remedied, thus
preventing emissions, but this also is not easily quantified.
In addition, drivers may voluntarily seek repairs prior to an
I/M inspection if their vehicle’s MIL indicates emissions
problems, which can result in emissions reductions long
before a vehicle is scheduled for I/M.
Even if state or local governments conclude that the
benefits of I/M do not exceed the costs, to avoid having an
I/M program may be difficult because the CAA requires
it in areas with serious air pollution problems. Moreover,
even if the CAA does not require I/M, the states, including
Utah, may voluntarily choose to adopt an I/M program in
order to obtain emission reduction credit that is needed
to demonstrate reasonable progress toward meeting ambient air quality targets. The I/M requirements represent a
policy that is based on the conditions of the 1970s, when
cheating was rampant and tampering was easy. Today,

47 ELR 10891

emission control technology is far more sophisticated and
tampering is more difficult. At this time, there is little current information to either support or reject the efficacy of
the I/M program.
Environmental law is becoming more focused on the
cost of regulations. On June 29, 2015, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that EPA “must consider cost—including,
most importantly, cost of compliance—before deciding
whether regulation is appropriate and necessary.”254 The
case involved the mercury and air toxic standards that
were being imposed on the power industry.255 The Court
held that EPA erred when it failed to consider the costs
of the regulation in making its initial determination that
the rule was appropriate and necessary. After remand, the
D.C. Circuit sent the rule back to EPA, and the Agency
decided the rule was necessary and appropriate even when
costs were taken into consideration.256 While the case can
be distinguished from the I/M program, it does indicate
that EPA should seriously consider costs and must consider them early in the regulatory process. It could be
useful to take a fresh look at the costs and benefits of
the I/M program. Such knowledge could result in a more
effective program.
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